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Abstract 
Infrastructure Proxies may convey assurance information derived from multiple sources, one of which may be 
‘social identity’ sources. This guidance explains under which conditions combination of assurance information 
and augmentation of identity data within the Infrastructure Proxy should result in assertion of the REFEDS 
Assurance Framework components “unique identifier”, and when it may be appropriate to assert the “identity 
proofing” component value low. 
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The Infrastructure Proxies that are a key feature of the AARC Blueprint architecture [AARC-
BPA] typically convey user information that has an authentication assurance derived from 
multiple sources, i.e. is the result of a “combined assurance evaluation” by the Infrastructure 
Proxy. In interoperability scenarios, the proxy is expected to associate an assurance profile 
with the authentication assertion provided to its ‘customers’, and, when required, to assert 
the assurance component values defined in the REFEDS Assurance Framework [RAF] 
specification.  
In the cases where the Infrastructure Proxy has derived the authentication in whole or 
principally from ‘social media’ identity providers (such as Google, Facebook, LinkedIn, etc.), 
the assurance profile provided with the authentication assertion will usually be “AARC-
Assam” (as specified in [AARC-G021]) – although nothing precludes the proxy from using 
supplemental business processes and combinations that might result in other assurance 
profiles.  
Yet when the primary source of identity is social, and no additional information is available, 
the question arises whether any of the specific assurance components specified in the 
REFEDS RAF are also applicable. In particular this concerns the ‘unique identifier’ 
(ID/unique) and the identity vetting component based on provided-email-address only 
(IAP/low). 
 Social media account qualities 
Many social media providers encourage unique, non-duplicate identifiers that are associated 
with real people. In particular Facebook and LinkedIn publish a policy that would make both 
duplicate and ‘fake’ accounts a violation of the terms of use. Yet in practice we observe that 
there is a large fraction of duplicate accounts (up to 10% even in Facebook, which stipulates 
a one account per person requirement explicitly in its terms and conditions1) and accounts 
not related to real known people (up to 3% in Facebook). Obviously there may also be more 
than one person with the same name. 
However, not all social media, email, and service providers are similarly diligent regarding 
identifier assignment, and may - for business or other reasons - re-assign identifiers after 
                                               
1 See e.g. page 7 in the Facebook statement of Q3 2017,  
<https://s21.q4cdn.com/399680738/files/doc_financials/2017/Q3/Q3-'17-Earnings-call-transcript.pdf>: 
"This quarter, we implemented a new methodology to help identify duplicate accounts. As a result, we 
increased our estimates for duplicate accounts to approximately 10% of worldwide MAUs from our previously 
disclosed estimate of 6%. Duplicate accounts are those that we believe are used by the same person and 
represent real activity and engagement on Facebook. 
We have also increased our estimate for inauthentic accounts to approximately 2-3% of worldwide MAUs. 
Inauthentic accounts are largely those that are used for spam and other policy-violating reasons." 
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deletion or a period of inactivity. Such providers include Yahoo2, Microsoft outlook (hotmail)3, 
and GitHub4. In these cases, the identifiers provided by that service have only point-in-time 
uniqueness: these cannot be used for asserting ID/unique, and should not be used for 
accounting linking in Proxies unless in continuous use without any period of inactivity 
(identifier re-assignment can happen within 30 days for e.g. Yahoo, so any period of 
inactivity longer than a 30-day period may imply a change of ownership). 
Thus for each social ID provider care is needed to assess their terms and conditions, and 
changes to the terms and conditions must be monitored by the Proxy. 
Neither duplicates nor non-personal accounts would pose much of an issue to an 
Infrastructure when the social account is used as an authenticating factor to an identified 
persona already known in the Infrastructure or community: by implication, there is an identity 
associated with a known person. In all these cases, then, we shall refer to the account as a 
known “Infrastructure identity”, which in itself will have the properties required in the 
REFEDS RAF from a “unique identifier”, namely: 
1. User account belongs to a single natural person 
2. The person and the credential they are assigned is traceable i.e. the CSP knows who 
they are and can contact them  
3. The user identifier will not be re-assigned 
4. The user identifier is eduPersonUniqueID or one of the pairwise identifiers 
recommended by REFEDS 
In particular requirement (2) can then be satisfied based on Infrastructure and community 
registries. To meet requirements (1), even in this case additional controls may be necessary. 
These controls can take the form of a policy statement, e.g. by adding to the infrastructure 
AUP that "I won't use a shared account to log in or disclose my credentials to anyone" and to 
some extent count on the implicit understanding by qualified Infrastructure users that 
accounts and authenticators are valuable. Excluding bots should be relatively easy: first, 
captchas tend to do a good enough job even if they annoy legitimate users, and second, 
while bots can join mailing lists, they have not yet, as far as we know, evolved the 
sophistication to join research communities and access services through CSPs. 
In absence of additional information to support (1), for Infrastructure identities whose 
accounts are solely backed by social media identity sources and nothing else, the basic 
                                               
2 “Our goal with reclaiming inactive Yahoo! IDs is to free-up desirable namespace for our users. [...] 
We will have a 30-day period between deactivation and before we recycle these IDs for new users. 
During this time, we’ll send bounce back emails alerting senders that the deactivated account no 
longer exists.” Quoted from a statement given to Wired, cited at 
https://www.pcworld.com/article/2042508/yahoo-tells-security-critics-to-chillax-regarding-its-email-
recycling-program.html, visited March 2018. 
3 The Microsoft Services agreement requires users to log in at least every 270 days. In a statement by 
Microsoft to WebWereld.nl, it confirms “that these email accounts are automatically placed in a queue 
on our servers and scheduled for deletion. Then, after in total 360 days, the email account name will 
be made available again.” Quoted by WebWereld (in Dutch), http://webwereld.nl/security/79529-
microsoft-recyclet-stilletjes-outlook--en-live-accounts, visited March 2018. 
4 While account uniqueness in a precise moment in time is granted, GitHub accounts are re-
assignable after deletion, see https://help.github.com/articles/deleting-your-user-account/ 
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requirements of REFEDS RAF “ID/unique” cannot be met. Based on the publicly known 
account qualities, and without compensatory controls, neither (1) “single natural person” nor 
(2) “… the CSP knows who they are …” can be satisfied. The duplicate accounts are not a 
critical issue in this respect, but particularly (2) would not be compatible with fake accounts, 
that are not ‘known’ to the credential service provider without linking to another identity or 
identifier.  
Additional heuristics can be applied by the Proxy to help meet these requirements. One valid 
option would be to verify control over a personal email address associated with a well-known 
and reputable organisation (e.g. the users home university or research institute on a 
managed domain, which would allow users with an institutional email address but no 
institutional IdP that releases attributes to participate in the Infrastructure). Such heuristics 
could even include behavioural analysis, or take other forms. The business logic thereof is to 
be determined by both technical and policy factors. 
Yet without such further processing it would be a violation of the REFEDS RAF specification 
to include “https://refeds.org/assurance/ID/unique” in the assurance attribute or claim 
provided by the Proxy to third parties. 
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 RAF component recommendations 
The above-listed consideration lead to the following guidance on asserting assurance 
component values: 
 
The Infrastructure ID is based solely on a social 
account, and no additional information has 
been collected and no heuristics applied to 
change the assurance 
Assert profile AARC-Assam 
DO NOT assert any REFEDS RAF component 
values 
The Infrastructure ID is co-based on a social ID, 
but there are linked identities, either provided 
externally or based on information 
independently obtained by the proxy through 
heuristic or other business logic, that provide 
additional keys to ‘who they are’ and that the 
user is a single natural person and not sharing 
the account.  
The social ID itself is never re-assigned. 
Assert profile AARC-Assam 
ALSO assert 
https://refeds.org/assurance/ID/unique 
The Infrastructure ID is co-based as above, but 
in addition either the Proxy or an ‘upstream’ 
identity source provides a valid email address 
through which the user can reasonably be 
expected to be reached 
Assert profile AARC-Assam 




With this combination, the recipient of assurance information from a Proxy can derive 
unambiguously the status of an account which is based wholly or partially on social media 
authentication. 
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